





In the past decade, distinctions have become
blurred between commercial banks and
otherdepository and nondepository institu-
tions. Financial and Congressional figures
thus have begun to debate the half-century-
old pieceoflegislation which putthose
distinctions into practice-theGlass-Steagall
Act (the Banking Act of 1933). Several bills
now before Congress would modifythe Act
in differentways-forexample, by permit-
ting banks, eitherdirectlyorthrough bank
holding-company subsidiaries, to undelWrite
municipal-revenue obligations and to offer
money-marketfunds. Such proposals also
would permit commercial banks toenter
certain restricted orprohibited areas-such
as investment advice, leasing, insurance,
data processing, and real-estate development
and brokering. Other issues arising from the
Glass-Steagall Act are also coming under
scrutiny-such as interstate banking, pay-
mentof interest on demand deposits, and the
structure ofthe Federal Reserve System. For
all these reasons, itwould be worthwhile to
reviewthe principal provisionsoftheActand
the circumstances which led to their
adoption.
Genesis of Act
President Roosevelt signed the Banking Actof
1933 into lawon June 16, 1933, after a two-
year-long period ofCongressional hearings
and studies. The Actwas authored bySenator
Carter Glass (D. Va.) and Congressman
Henry Steagall (D. Ala.), the chairmen ofthe
Senate and House Banking Committees. ,
Glass-Steagall was a child ofthe Great
Depression, and specifically reflected aCon-
gressional response to the demise ofsome
10,000banks between the crash of1929and
the imaginatively-named BankHolidayof
1933. In their reports, however, the Con-
gressional BankingCommittees blamed these
problems primarilyupon developments
arising out ofthe prosperous 1920s. These
includedan excessive increase in bank credit
for speculative purposes, especially loans to
brokers and the publicforcarrying securities,
which had been facilitated by a substantial
buildupofsurplus reserves resulting from
large gold imports and Federal Reserve op-
erations. The Committees also blamed the
breakdownupon the growthofbankaffiliates
("thegreatest danger"), which "devotethem-
selves in manycases to perilous undelWriting
operations, stock speculation, and main-
taining a market for the banks' own stock,
often largely with the resources ofparent
banks."
Key provisions
In an attemptto assure the safety and sound-
ness ofthe bankingsystem, Congressthrough
Glass-Steagall provided a clear separation
between commercial and investment bank-
ing-and between banking and commerce
generally. Specifically, Section 16 stipulated
that nationally-chartered banks be limited to
purchasing and selling investment securities
"solely upon the order, and forthe account
of, customers and in no case for their own
account". Thatsection, however, imposed no
restrictions on undelWriting and dealing in
U.s. government obligations, Federal agency
issues, and general obligations ofstate and
local governments. (Section Sextended the
Glass-Steagall prohibitions from nationally-
chartered banks-whichmustbe Federal Re-
serve members-to state-chartered member
banks as welL) On the other hand, Congress
excluded municipal-revenue obligations
from the laundry list ofsecurities eligible for
acquisition, and the courts have interpreted
that exclusion as an implicit prohibition of
such activities-thereby complicating life for
many institutions today which would like to
deal in such securities.
Regarding boundary lines between institu-
tions, Section 11 ofthe Act prohibited any
memberbank from acting as an agentfor any
non-banking entity in making loans to bro-
kers ordealers in stocks, bonds, and other
investment securities. To resolve any doubts,
Section 20 further stipulated that no member
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ation, association, business trust, or similar
organization engaged principally inthe issue,
flotation, undelWriting, public sale, ordis-
tribution at wholesale or retail, or through
syndicate participation, ofstocks, bonds,'
debentures, notes, or other securities." The
bill's authors recognized the difficultyof
separating member banks completely from
financial affiliates ofvarious types, but re-
quired that the examination ofremaining
affiliates be carried out in a manner "as con-
sistent as possible" with the examination of
parent banks. Congress subsequently ex-
panded these restrictions considerably by
bank holding-company legislation.
Further, Section 21 prohibited anyone in the
securities business from receiving deposits
subject to check "or repayment upon pre-
sentation ofapassbook, certificateofdeposit,
orevidence ofdebt" This constraint may
raise questions about the activities oftoday's
money-market mutual funds, which hold
about $185 billion in customeraccountswith
check-writing privileges. These accounts,
however, technically represent shares and
notdeposits, and thus do not come under
Glass-Steagall restrictions.
Payment of interest
In another move to enhance the "safety and
soundness" ofthe banking system, Glass-
Steagall's Section 11 provided that no
member bank "directlyor indirectly, by any
means whatsoever, shall pay any interest on
any deposit which is payable on demand."
(Congress laterextended this restriction to
non-memberbanks underthe Banking Actof
1935.) NOWaccounts and "othercheckable
deposits", which amounttoabout$75 billion
today, do not fall under this prohibition
because most such accounts technically are
considered savings deposits underthe terms
ofthe MonetaryControl Actof 1980.
The authors ofthe Glass-Steagall Act utilized
several different arguments in supporting a
prohibition on demand-deposit interest They
believedthat large banks'paymentofinterest
on "bankers' balances" in the 1920s had
siphoned funds from rural areas. Again, they
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believed thatthe prohibition, by reducing
costs, would induce banks to avoid risky
high-yielding investments, and would also
makethem betterableto pay the premiumon
deposit insurance required under another
provision ofthe Act However, many studies
have questioned the argument that payment
ofinterest on demand deposits had contrib-
uted to the widespread bank failures ofthe
early 1930s. The siphoning-of-funds argu-
ment, for example, overlooked the fact that
thetypical rate on bankers' balances, at about
two percent in the 1920s, was less than the
5-to-5V, percent average rate ofreturn on
bank portfolios at that time.
Geographic restrictions
Finally, Glass-Steagall got into an area which
even now, a half-century later, isamatterof···
intense controversy-interstate banking. The
Act specifically amended the McFadden-
Pepper Act of 1927to allow (national and
state-chartered) Federal Reserve member
banks to branch whereverstate-chartered
nonmember banks could do so. Ironically,
the McFadden Act had been considered a
liberalizing measure, since iteased certain
branching restrictions on memberbanks.
Nonetheless, until 1933,itstill prohibited any
memberbank, even in states which permitted
state-wide branching, from establishing new
branches outside the parent (home office)
city, and it required any new memberto
divest itselfofany branches established
outside ofthe home-office city after passage
ofthe Act
The period between the passage ofthe
McFadden and Glass-Steagall Acts provided
agood laboratoryexperimentofthe health of
branch-banking systems. The best example
came from the San Francisco (Twelfth)
Federal Reserve District, where branch
banking was quite common and where
several states permitted statewide branching.
This district accounted for less than five
percentofthe 10,000 bank failures ofthe
1929-33 Depression,and only a few ofthe
Western branch systems succumbed during
this period. (In 1929, only 64 ofthe 1,333
Western bankswere branch systems, buttheyaccounted for over 40 percent ofall banking
offices in the district.)
In view ofthe relative strength ofbranch-
banking systems during the Depression era,
several Congressmen included a provision in
an earlydraftofthe 1933 billthatwould have
permitted a national bank to establish
branches in an adjacent state within 50 miles
ofits home office. However, Congress de-
leted the provision in the final mark-upofthe
measure because ofthe strong opposition of
unitbankers and most state banking author-
ities. Congress also rejected a similar pro-
vision in the Banking Actof 1935 that would
have allowed branch banking on a regional
oreconomic-area basis.
Remaining issues
A numberofimportant issues still remain.
Perhaps the basic issue is simply-what is a
bank? (See the Weekly Letters ofJanuary 22
and January 29, 1982.) In the past, we could
argue that only banks through their deposit-
takingand lendingactivitiescreated deposits.
Today, however, that distinction between
bank and nonbank firms no longerapplies,
especially with the sharp increase in check'
able deposits at thrift institutions, and with
non-depository institutions(such as securities
brokers and dealers) offering money-market
mutual funds.
Another issue involves the measure ofcom-
petition-i.e., the numberofcompetitors in
the financial industry, orthe scope, pricing
and convenience ofthe services which they
offer. Related tothis is the question ofwhen
size becomes sociallyundesirable, regardless
ofeconomies ofscale,and otherconsider-
ationsofeconomicefficiency. Ifwesubstitute
the word IIsuccess" for "size," we can per-
haps understand the nature ofthe dilemma
moreclearly.
Other questions concern the appropriate
dividing line between competition and coop-
eration in financial markets. For example, the
pioneering BankAmericard found its most
effective competitor in a rival vehicle devel-
oped by a group ofother large banks acting
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together. The consumerclearly benefitted
from this competition between giant con-
cerns. Moreover, through the cooperative
mechanism offranchising, such cards and
theirsuctessors have become importantmar-
keting tools for small depository institutions
which are unable to support the heavy costs
ofdevelopingand marketing cards on their
own. Today, with electronictransfers offunds
growing rapidly, the implications ofanti-trust
policy regarding joint ventures assume great
significance forthe competitive viability
offinancial institutions offering payments-
related services.
Another unresolved issue concerns theques-
tion of Federal versus state and local control.
Congress is nowunder pressure to assert an
overriding Federal interest in certain areas,
such as in proposed legislation for a Federal
preemption ofstate usury laws and ofstate
legal rulings regarding mortgage "dueon
sale" clauses. In the opposite direction,
Congress is under pressure to remove earlier
Federal controls on state actions, such as in
legislation to repeal the McFadden Act. In
that case, Congress a half-century ago speci-
fically delegated authority to the states to
regulate interstate commerce in a specific
industry; i.e., to allowthestates toutilizestate
lines as barriers to the expansion ofinterstate
banking businesses. These conflicting pres-
sures seem likely to continue, despite the
approach underthe New Federalism toward
expanding the scope of state and local
control.
Withthesecond session ofthe 97thCongress
nowconvening, the Houseand Senate Bank-
ing Committees will resume deliberations on
both "emergency" and comprehensive
"restructuring" legislation-just as they did
in 1933. Thus, it may be worth noting atthis
time what the authors ofthe Glass-Steagall
Act had to say about this basic problem: "the
United States will never have a completely
strong banking system until such time as it
should succeed in fully harmonizing and ad-
justing state and federal laws on banking
matters." Forty-nine years later ....
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)











Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 156,170 - 161 9,222 6.3
loans (gross, adjusted) -total# 135,001 - 288 10,556 8.5
Commercial and industrial 41,458 - 231 4,498 12.2
Real estate 55,912 24 5,221 10.3
Loans to individuals 23,712 - 48 - 81 0.3
Securities loans 2,038 - 40 564 38.3
U.S. Treasury securities* 6,031 194 - 771 - 11.3
Other securities* 15,138 - 67 - 542 3.5
Demand deposits - total# 40,398 -1,613 - 1,556 3.7
Demand deposits - adjusted 28,042 -1,943 - 2,129 7.1
Savings deposits - total 30,754 - 280 1,477 5.0
Time deposits - total# 90,077 528 14,457 19.1
Individuals, part. &corp. 81,059 483 15,095 22.9
(large negotiable CD's) 35,953 218 6,334 21.4
Weekly Averages
ofDaily figures
Member Bank Reserve Position
Excess Reserves (+)jDefidency(-)
Borrowings if
















* Excludes trading account securities.
# Includes items not shown separately.
Editorial comments may beaddressed to the editor (William Burke) orto theauthor.... Freecopiesofthis
andotherFederal Reservepublicationscanbeobtained bycallingorwritingthe Public Infonnation Section,
Federal Reserve Bankof San-Francisco1P.O. Box 7702, san Francisco94120. Phone (415) 544~2184.